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 EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES IN COMPETITION
1. Introduction
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) has meant an important step forwards
in the process of European integration. Most atten ti on is paid to
the monetary aspect and especially the introduc tion of a common
cur rency. With respect to the goods market most pro gress is made in
the context of the GATT, in order to lower the common protec tion
wall. Up to Maastricht the labour market was, with some excep tions,
not part of deliberate con sultati ons on top level. But now the
Treaty has arranged a free European Union (EU) la bour market,
discrimi nation between employees of the various member countries is
forbidden. The United Kingdom has claimed not to be bound by the
social section of the Treaty.
There may be two reasons for this relative silence around the
free European labour market issue. First, there are severe
differences in opinion between the country members. Tripartite
consultations, regularly held in Brussels, between European unions,
employers' organizations and 'government' are not very successful.
Second, it is hoped that the member countries will adapt their
institutional frameworks in such a way that cen tral coordinatio n is
not necessary anymore.
It is rather easy to understand why it is so difficult to reach
agreements in the EU tripartite consultations. The economic and
social performances differed much and so with the institutional
frameworks. When we compare the u nemployment figures, the picture
is somewhat more complicated. Since the oil crises in the seven-
ties, also the Northern economies have faced financi al troubles
leading to lower growth and higher unemployment rates. The global
process of economic restructu ring requires a level of flexibility
that makes it difficult for the Northern economies to maintain
their social welfare systems as they had built during the sixties.
Also when looking at the institutions we find major diffe rences
between the various EU-members. So is the level of regulation in
the Nordic countries much higher than in the Sout hern countries
such as Greece and Portugal. The basic problem of a free labour
market in a economically, socially and politically highly hetero-
geneous EU is that one-way traf fic can take place from South to
North. Migration flows will be stimulated from low wage to high
wage areas, from high unem ploy ment to low unemployment areas, and
from badly organised to well organised social systems.
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Suppose there woul d have been no social services provided by
the state. Then basic neoclassical economics would predict a
process of factor equalisation, leading to a squeezing out of
differences in the levels of wages and unemployment. The intro-
duction of nationally organised redistribution of wealth will mean
an incentive for net tax payers to out migrate and for net benefit
receivers to immigrate, until the difference between the degree of
redistribution has disappeared (Stigler, 1957). If the EU-countries
are unable to coordinate their social poli cies,"spo ntaneous"
institutional adjust ment proces ses will undoubtedly lead to more
austerity of the generous systems in the North. May be Southern
economic growth will stimulate the design of more sophisticated
social systems in that region, implying a develop ment in the
direction of a higher, more extended, generous and universal level.
Although a complete equalisation of institu tions will not happen
because of the geographic and cultural distance that must be
bridged, social conflicts will undoubtedly arise in case of social
shopping.  
One might hope that spontaneous institu tional adjustments will
partially solve the internal coordina tion problems, the question
remains however, whether the EU can solve its common external
problem in this respect. Demo graphic developments on the one hand
and economic restructu ring processes on the other hand, both on a
global level, have created a permanently growing problem for the
EU-countries in terms of immigration flows. Growing numbers of
people try to find a living in the EU-area. Some of them are
successful; most of them have a hard living and are simply waiting
for better times. Since the seventies the EU-countries have imple-
mented an immigration stop, as a policy reaction on the growth of
unemployment. This means that many immigrants, who have entered the
EU the last twenty years are illegals, making the situation
problematic.
Both questions, that of internal and that of external coor-
dination, are highly intertwined. A well coordinated external
policy with respect to immigration, will definitely contribute to a
better functioning of the internal labour market. But a well
functioning internal market is better able to deal with external
pressures.
In this article we will deal with the problem of growing
competition between the different institutional frameworks of the
national labour markets. In section 2 we will demonstrate that
labour market institutions are set up to organize a so-called
solidarity transfer. Empirical research with respect to the design
of welfare states shows us three patterns to be distin guis hed, to
wit the conservative, the liberal and the social democra tic
framework (Esping-Andersen, 1990). All three types of insti tutions
have their own view on the content of solidarity. In the EU after
Maastricht 1992, the different structures have to compe te with each
other. This is the sub ject of the sections 3, 4 and 5. In the sixth
section we will analyse whether it is possi ble to m aintain a decent
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level of solidari ty, with or without explicit European regulation.
In section 7 we will work out a concrete proposal with respect to
the minimum internal coordina tion necessary for a well functi oning
labour market. In a last section we will deal with the problem of
the external immigration pressures and the way Europe could deal
with it. We end up with an epilogue.
2. The Welfare State as a Solidarity Transfer
When we look at the genesis of the modern European welfare states,
they all appear to be reactions on the negative social effects of a
free market economy. The nineteenth century was characterised by
widespread poverty and unemployment, while the po liti cal power was
in the hands of conservatives and/or libe rals.
Primitive conservatives only saw a problem of order. A society
consists of several ranks. Membership of a rank is not a matter of
private choice, but in general determined by birth. The lowest rank
fulfils the function of being the hands and the feet of society.
The task of the first rank is to convince the people of this truth
and to maintain law and order. To educate next genera tions in the
true conservative culture the family context is the appropriate
environment in which this education must take place. The father
repre sents the authority in the family. In case of violence and
crimi nality suppression is the only efficient answer; in the con-
text of the family as well as the polity. 1
In later years more sophisticated versions of the conservative
view were developed. The problem of order can partially be
prevented by organising good care for those people who really need
it. When we want to hold society together we must be solida ristic
with the people of our rank who are in need of help. On the
national level Bismarck was the first who imple mented conser vative
welfare policies. When we look at the organisational pattern we see
that the social security arran gements are the core of the system
and that the social strati fication of society is left intact. This
means that solidarity is organised per stratum. For the very poor
and unemployed the conservative state will organise work in order
to give them a living on subsistence level. For people who are
unable to work a social assistance benefit is available, but only
if they could not built up social security rights and have no rela-
tives who can care for them. After Bismarck in Germany several
other nations have developed conservative welfare states, such as
Switzer land and Austria.
The primitive liberal view on the problems of poverty and
unemployment in a free market economy was quite different. Liberals
were positive about the break down of the ranking society in
several European and Anglo-Saxon countries. The United States was
                                               
          1 Hobbes has analyzed as one of the first social
philosophers the problem of authority and control in a
so-called modern society (Hobbes, 1651).
Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.
considered a shining example. A free market was seen as a
progressive mechanism, through which a society would reach high
levels of wealth for everyone. So 19th centu ry poverty was
interpreted as an una voidable short term pheno menon. Spontaneous
processes of an evolutiona ry character would give maximum space for
individual initiative to improve the situation. This would also
imply that for the handi capped people suffi cient resources would be
available for a decent living. Innate moral sentiments would imply
a strong positive income elasticity for "charity". (Locke, 1690;
Hume, 1739; Smith, 1759).
When poverty held on during the 19th  century, some liberals
recognised the necessity of government intervention with respect to
the position of the very poor. The optimism about the bles sings of
the free market for all was recognised to be based on the
assumption of rationality of the individual. But in practise not
all individuals appeared to meet the basic requirements to be
rational and to be able to care for them selves. So must the
government protect children against pa rents who used them as a
productive resource for themselves in place of an investment good
that must be profitably used by the children themselves when they
had become adults (Smith, 1776). The same could be said of the
elder people who did not have the energy anymore to care for
themselves. So liberals took the political initiative to develop
legislation to care for the elderly and to forbid children's
labour. Now a liberal welfare state can be interpreted as a set of
services, provi ded by the government, only meant for those who are
really unable to earn a living in a free market society: the old,
the very poor and the seriously handicapped people. Other people
are expected to conclude the necessary assurance con tracts on the
free market in order to be sure of a decent living in case of bad
luck.
A third view that is r elevant to understand the genesis of the
modern European welfare state is the social democratic view. During
the 19th century there is a growing group of people who reject the
conservative view being elitist, but also object against the
liberal view, being too individua listic. So, in agreeing with the
liberals that the capitalist society is an evolutionary improvement
compared with the traditional ranking society, they sharply
disagree with the liberals in their view that a liberal socie ty is
in the inte rest of the mass of the workers. Where the liberals
focus their strategy on the freedom of the individual from govern-
mental coercion, strive the socia lists for more than such a kind of
freedom (Berlin, 1978). Individuals who do not dispose of any means
will not attach much value to a liberal kind of liberty. In other
words, the structure of society creates a huge inequality in
opportunities between people. It must be the task of the govern ment
to regulate society in such a way that all people are socially and
politically equal and that all of them have access to a number of
basic provisions, such as housing, health care, basic education and
an income suffi cient to participate in our society. Marx can be
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conside red as the founding father of this view. La ter on the socia-
list movement split up in two groups. The first continued the
revolu tionary strategy focussed on the expropriation of the capita-
lists. The second group adapted the original view into a more
evolutionary one (Bernstein, 1899). As soon as the poli tical sector
was transformed into a parliamentary democracy, the improvement of
the position of the working class had to be strived for by legal
means.
The socialist and social democratic movement can, to a large
extent, be held responsible for the building up of a univer sal,
extended and generous welfare state. Solidarity in the social
democratic sense of the word is not restricted to members of the
own rank or to people who are really unable to earn their own
living. Solidarity means that every person must have the same
opportu nities to develop his capaci ties. The only wealth diffe-
rences that are socially acceptable are those that are the result
of differences in efforts (Tinber gen, 1975). If two people are
equal, except their preference for leisure, then wealth (exclu ding
the value of leisure) of the man who spends more hours on working
is allowed to be higher, so building up more wealth.
 
We have shortly sketched three different views on the func tion of
the welfare state. The differences are explained by three different
views on an efficient and fair organisation and speci fication of
the concept "solidarity". In practice each country has developed an
institutional pattern that can be understood as a mix of the ideal
types as just sketched. Political parties are the exponents of
particular mixes of principles. In many cases coalitions between
two or more parties are necessary for the formation of a cabinet
(De Swaan, 1973; Esping-Andersen, 1990). So are the countries in
South and Central Europe dominated by conservative and social
democratic parties and coalitions. In the Nordic countries the
influence of the social democratic view has been overwhelming for
alrea dy a very long time. During the last three decennia the pro-
cess of secularisation and individualisati on has influ enced all
European countries. In general we can say that this pro cess has
strengthened the influence of the liberal view (Fuku yama, 1992).
In the next section we will deal with the compe tition be tween
institutional patterns on a free labour market.
Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.
3. The Problem of Institutional Competition
3.1 Migration
Migration has been an important phenomenon already since the
beginning of human life. As is the case in the animal world, human
beings are characterised by contradictory inclinations. First, they
are constantly looking for improvement of their situation.
Migration is one of the many expressions of this search. On the
other hand man is inclined to defend his pro perties. This also
implies the defence of the 'own' territory against intruders,
irrespective the question whether such policy is beneficial or
not. 2 The social relationships be tween diffe rent groups of people
has always been of a rather con flictuous charac ter. Strangers are
only welcome if they are small in number and prepared to adjust to
the dominant culture as soon as possi ble. If not, then they have to
move to avoid permanent discrimi nation.
 
3.2 Conservative Order
In order to dampen permanent rivalry between diffe rent groups, t wo
types of policies were implemented in earlier times.
A particular group was structured by means of a number of
ranks. The different ranks were linked to particular func ti ons,
that were necessary to be fulfilled in order to let the group
function well. In Europe the most familiar ranks were the nobili ty,
the clerus and the so-called third rank, being a collection of
skilled and unskilled workers, artisans, traders and entrepre neurs.
In this way the various groups were hierar chically ranked. This
also implied that competition and rival ry was limited to members of
the same rank. Conflicts remain very restricted, because people of
the third rank were not inclined to imitate people of the second or
even the first rank. No necessity to imitate means that many
desires remain unarticulated, making many things less scarce as
they are now today (Achterhuis, 1988). The relationships between
groups in  different regions were structu red by the formation of
empires, states or nations. The political problems in the Middle
East are a good illustration of the fact that it is a dangerous
situation when a particular people does not have its own area,
where they can live rather independently.
In Continental Europe the ranking society reached its culmi-
nation in the absolutist period - that is the 18th century. In
contrast to the Continent was England less hierarchically organi-
zed. The kings had to consult or negotiate or even fight against a
parliament, representing the higher ranks of society. This specific
Anglo-Saxon democracy has always been characterised by a higher
                                               
          2 This is in compliance with the famous Kahneman-Tverski
results, that man is inclined to sacrifice chances to
win a fortune for the certainty not to loose. See for
their famous article (1986) in  the Cook-Levi reader,
1990.
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level of conflicts, but on the other hand it may be an explanation
for the fact that a revolution has never taken place on the British
Islands.
 
3.3 The French Revolution
The French Revolution (1789) is a very important watershed in
Continental Europe. The third rank wanted to participate in the
political decision making process (Grab,1989). During the 19th
century the influence of the bourgeoisie and the proleta riat grew,
leading to important changes in the political, social and economic
relationships. Whereas in the 19th century politics was mainly
influenced by liberalism, during the 20th century Conti nental
institutions transformed in social demo cratic direction. In
concreto this meant a process of deregu lation of markets, follo wed
by increasing government interven tion to protect the inte rests of
the workers.
It is important to realize that the lines as they are sket ched
now, are very rough. Under the influence of a number of dramatic
events conservative policies showed some temporary increase in
popularity. For example during the First World War and during the
period of the Great Depression of the Thirties, governments could
not resist pressures to protect capital interests, leading to more
restrictions in global trade. But if we take the period of the last
three centuries as a whole, we can conclude to a process of gradual
and partial transfor mation of the institutions from a mainly
conservative pattern, via one which also includes liberal elements
to one that includes strong social democratic features as well.
 
3.4 Liberal Institutions Drive Out Other Institutions
Suppose we live in a perfectly conservative world. Then a group of
people, living in a particular area, is enlightened by liberal
thought. They introduce liberal institutions, expecting higher
rates of growth from it. Assume this growth really happens, leading
to a rise in the demand for labour. For eign workers are attracted,
in numbers that are in compli ance with the needs of the liberal
society. The conservative environment looses workers that had the
guts to take initiati ve and the risks of going abroad. That is
undoubtedly a loss. History of Continental Europe shows the
reaction of the con servative world: political and military action
to counter the liberal development. Assume this does not happen in
our imagi ned world. The alternative is an institutional adjustment
of the conservative world in liberal direction, in order not to
loose too many valuable workers. In other words, liberal instituti-
ons drive out conservative institu tions, under the condition of
absence of political and military action.
 
Suppose we live in a perfectly liberal world. Then a group of
people, living in a particular area, is enlightened by social
democratic thought. They introduce a well organised welfare state,
in which all people who are, temporarily or permanently, not able
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to earn an income, receive the resour ces, necessary for a decent
living, from the state. Now pro ductive people in the  social
democratic state have an incenti ve to emigrate to a liberal state,
to lower their tax burden. The less or improducti ve people have an
incentive to immigrate to the social democratic state. The liberal
state enjoys the immigration flow of producti ve people, while the
social demo cratic state gets into growing financial trouble. This
means that liberal institutions drive out social democratic
institu tions, under the condition of absence of political and
milita ry action.
 
In both cases liberal institutions drive out its competi tors. This
result is not remarkable, because we have created a world in which
political action is not allowed. So the game is played according to
the rules of the market. Suppose political action is allowed in our
imagined world. A liberal state does not need political action,
except as an eventual re-action on political moves from other,
conservative or social democratic, states. A liberal state will not
be inclined to stop immigra tion; neither from conservative, nor
from social democratic areas. A conserva tive state will be inclined
to stop immigra tion from liberal states, because, if there would be
any inflow, the workers are expected to be relatively unproducti ve.
But immigration from social democratic states would be allowed,
because of the expec ted high level of productivity of the
immigrants. The social democratic state however is incli ned to an
overall migration stop: net tax payers are not allowed to emigrate
and net benefit receivers are not allowed to immigrate. Of course
net tax payers are allowed to come in, but these flow will be
marginal. And so with the net benefit receivers, who are allowed to
emigrate.
 
3.5 The Danger of Military Action
Current practice shows that it is increasingly difficult to get the
implementation of an immigration stop effective. The former Soviet
Union was really effective in controlling migra tion flows in and
out. But a number of years ago (1989 especi ally), such  an extensive
system of control of all important flows of workers, capital and
goods appeared to be unaccepta bly inef fective in terms of wealth.
If we assume that a com plete stop is too costly, then social
democratic and conserva tive states must accept  some adjustment in a
liberal directi on.
Suppose a social democratic or conservative country is not
willing to accept institutional adjustments. Then they can try to
convince liberal countries to adjust their institutions in
conservative or social democratic direction. May be they have some
success. The problem however, is that all liberal coun tries must be
willing to cooperate in a more regulated system. Because such a
kind of cooperation is not very liberal, voluntary coop eration is
not probable. Then military action is the only strate gy that is
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left. 3
3.6 Distance
An important reason why huge immigration flows have not been taken
place, is the fact that moving from one area or state to another is
a costly affair. Not only the bridging of a geo graphi cal distance,
but also the bridging of cultural diffe rences including language
implies considerable disutilities.    
Two developments however, make that the distances has signi-
ficantly reduced. First, the constant decrease in transporta tion
costs, making it easier for people to have their job on a reaso-
nably large distance from 'home'. Second the constant improvement
in communication via television and other techno logies together
with the increasing numbers of people who are using English as
their second language. If the distance has become under a criti cal
minimum an explosion in migration flows may occur, under the
condition that there are no other real restrictions on the
immigration towards a particular country. Especially if first
groups of pioneers have bridged the gap, a network of people of the
same ethnicity is develo ped, making a strong growth in immigration
more probable (King, 1994, Briggs, 1994)                          
  
4.  Public Choice Theory on Institutional Competition   
In the foregoing we have asked ourselves the question what happens
if conservative, social democratic and liberal states live side by
side with open borders. We have drawn the conclu sion that there is
a tendency towards liberal institutions. But as we all know
liberalism has a diffi culty in dealing with the phenome non of
public goods (Hayek,1978) 4. For our purpose we have to focus
especially on so-called Local Public Goods (LPG). The concept local
                                               
          3 When we look at the conflict between the Western world
and a number of orthodox and fundamentalist Islamic
countries and groups, we can say that, without military
action, Western culture drives out Islamic culture.
          4 Hayek has made a distinction between classical or Anglo-
Saxon liberalism and Continental European libera lism.
The first mentioned sort of liberalism consider as the
main task of legislation to protect the indivi dual
citizen against power abuse by the government. The
second sort of liberalism considers as the main task of
legislation to protect the poor and powerless against
power abuse by private groups such as big business and
the church. Hayek himself is in this distinction a
classical liberal. And these group of people tend to
deny most examples of public goods to be really public
goods. Hayek admits that in case of widespread poverty a
welfare system is practically spoken necessary, but
theoretically difficult to justify.
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refers to an area for which a parti cular good is public. What hap-
pens in a liberal world consis ting of a large number of loca tions
where libe rally orien ted people are living. Every commu nity or
society takes its own decisions with respect to their own set of
public goods. Suppose every citizen of a particular society has to
pay according to the Lindahl pricing system (Mueller, 1988).
Internal equilibrium can be reached. But what if immi gration and
emigration is allowed and mobility costs are zero. The classic
analysis of Tiebout shows us that there is an equili brium solu tion,
although it is not clear how in practice such an equilibrium can be
reached (Tie bout, 1956). Tiebout assumes in fact monopolistic
competitive mar kets. All citizens of every municipality possess all
the information relevant for their choice of municipality.
We can distinguish two tendencies in this case. First, citizens
are inclined to form clusters with rather homogeneous preferen ces.
We see for example a split between those who prefer a more urban
live versus those who prefer a more rural life. Second, another
basis for clustering is the level of wealth. Those who are
relatively wealthy, are inclined to vote for particular sets of
local public goods, such as room for golf courses and broad ways
and many parking houses for all their cars; in short many public
utilities of a rather expen sive kind. Those who have a relatively
low level of wealth may prefer a well organised public transport
system and a number of public swimming pools, because they can't
afford a private ly owned car and swimming poo l. With respect to the
financing of the public services people with lower wealth levels
strive for redistributi ve pay systems and are inclined to look for
municipalities that combine identical preferences and an average
level of wealth that is higher than the own wealth level. We can
imagine that people need much time to look for their optimal
location. Especially in a world without mobility costs and absence
of cultural differen ces, except the hetero geneity of preferences,
it takes a lot of energy and time before a citizen has found his
optimal place (Kolen, 1996). If the tax system of a particular
municipality is characterized by a flat rate, then the incentive
for people with a relative low income to live in a group with
higher incomes on average will be weaker. If all local public goods
with a club charac ter set their prices independently from the
income level of the member, then only small differen ces be tween
incomes of the citizens will be optimal.
 
As already said, in the Tiebout world equilibrium is possi ble. But
what will happen if the municipalities have the opportunity to
implement redistributive  policies. This problem is analysed by
Pauly (1973). Traditional public choice analy sis considers
redistribution as Pareto-inferior, because the welfare of people,
who pay a positive net tax, decreases in case of such a kind of
policy. Moreover will the redistri butive system mean that net tax
payers out migrate and net benefit receivers immigrate to a
municipality with such a system. As long as there is no central
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authority that solves the prisoners' dilemma, the externalities
leading to migration flows will make redistribution on the local
level impossible. Pauly however analyses this situation on the
basis of a number of assumptions that differ from the tradi tional
analy sis basically on two points.
In the first place he assumes utility interdependence. People
are, to a certain extent at least, altruistic. That means that the
utility level reached by poor people has a positive influence on
the level of utili ty of non-poor people. Poverty has external
effects, aes thetical ly, morally and with respect to crime that
results from it.
In the second place introduces Pauly the concept of 'distan ce'
in the analysis. By distance he means the geograp hical distance as
well as the frequency of contacts between various sorts of people.
The rest of his assumptions are traditi onal or meant to make the
analysis convenient.
  His conclu sions are rather diffe rent from those of Tiebout. In
the first place is redistribution necessary for achieving Pareto-
optimali ty. In the second place determines the distance be tween the
different municipalities the level of decision making. In the
Tiebout analysis mobility costs are assumed to be zero. That
implies a maximum of decentralizati on. In the Pauly analysis the
level depends on the distance; if the distance is assumed to be
zero, the Pauly model would advise us, in contrast to the Tiebout
model, a maximum of centraliza tion.
We think that the introduction of u tility interdependence and
distance has made the analysis more realistic. A new pro blem has
arisen however. Pauly assumes that a redistribution policy has no
influence on the work effort. This assumption is convenient for the
model maker, but not realistic. So we can draw the conclusion that,
although the external effects of poverty are positive, the income
elasticities of work effort and of immigration have a negative
effect on the optimal degree of redistribution.
5.  Spational Economics on Institutional Competition
In a recent article Hockman et al.(1995) blame the Local Public
Goods (LPG) literature of an inappropriate dealing with the space
dimension.
In the non-spatial theories of fiscal federalism for every type
of LPG there is one optimal level of decision making. By (impli cit-
ly) abstracting from space LPG's can be ranked accor ding to the
degree of exclusion that is possible when produ cing a parti cular
LPG. If exclusion of people from consump tion is perfectly
impossible, then the good is a perfect public good. If exclusion is
perfectly possible, then the good is a perfect club good. 5 In case
                                               
          5 In the modern classification of public goods the non-
rivalness condition is transformed in a continuum
expressing the degree of congestion (that implies
rivalry); the non-excluda bility condition is transformed
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of a club good a user charge is the optimal pay system. In case of
a public good all people who cannot be excluded from consumption
should pay for it. Theoreti cally every user of the public good
should pay accor ding to the Lindahl pricing sy stem.
But when we bring the dimension space explicitly into the
analy sis, it appears that, because every LPG has its own optimal
jurisdiction, all these jurisdictions overlap each other to a high
degree. But this means that the fact that someone lives in a
particular area, does not imply anything with respect to his
preference for or against a particular LPG. In such a situation we
don't have any argument to tax persons for the use of LPG's except
in the case of a club good. Wherever the borderlines between the
different municipalities, it is likely that people profit from some
but not all of the LPG's that are offered by the municipality.
Hockman et al. refer to a solution already suggested by Henry
George (1879). Everyone who owns a piece of land within the borders
of a particular jurisdiction, has to pay land 'rent' to the public
authority. The level of the rent depends on the amount of money the
local government needs for the finance of the LPG's they offer
(minus the total amount of user charge they receive from the supply
of club goods). The allocation mechanism functi ons as follows. If
the after tax profitability of land is positi ve, more persons want
to live within the borders of the municipa lity under scrutiny. The
price of the land will rise, leading to a lower level of
profitability. If the profitability is negative, landowners will
offer their land for sale and out migrate. So there is a tendency
towards an equilibrium number of residents, given a particular
supply of LPG's. 6 Of course the local govern ment can adjust its
package so as to manipulate the volume of its population. In
general it has many instruments or action para meters to its
disposal in order to improve the quality of the municipality.
One important problem has not been solved yet. What to do if the
relatively well-to-do people leave the city, develop their own
municipalities on a short distance of a large city. So they profit
from their own expensive LPG's, but also from the LPG's of the
large city, without paying for that. Such deve lopment is disastrous
for the city, at least from a financial point of view. That makes
it difficult for the city to approp riately deal with the negative
externalities of poverty and congestion. In practice we see a
clustering of a number of towns and villages with a large city.
This clustering of jurisdictions is a task of the central
                                                                                                                                                             
into a continuum expressing the degree of exclusion.
Perfect exclusion means a perfect club good and perfect
non-exclusion means a perfect public good. See for
literature: Adams, McCormick, 1985.
          6 The George principle holds that in equilibrium the
marginal costs for attracting another resident is equal
to the marginal benefits of that action.
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government. 7 The new cluster is called a metropolitan area ,
governed by a metropo litan government (Olson,1969; Hockman et
al.,1995).
 
With respect to our problem we must ask ourselves the ques tion
whether or not it is possible to exclude people from outside the
metropolis to rivalrously use metropolitan public goods and
aggravating the problem of congestion and negative externalities. 
Suppose metropolis A has solved its externa lity pr oblems. The rich
suburbs contribute in the payment of the LPG package sup plied by A.
If other metropolitans have not solved their problems adequately,
this may induce a flow of immigrants and capital to A. As long as
the immigrants are sufficiently paying for the LPG's, A develops
itself along an equilibrium path. But if the inflows consists of
poor immigrants who imply net costs, A will get into trouble.
Expansion of economic activities will only happen as long as they
are profitable. The flows of goods, capital and people that are
generated, must pay the taxes that are needed to prevent or to
compensate for the growing exter nalities. Under the assumption of a
perfectly functioning public administrati on, metropolis A only get
into trouble, if there are cost generating flows that cannot be
taxed, so as to mitigate or compensate for the costs. Such a kind
of imbalance happens if the redistribution in A is stronger than in
other metropoli tans and if the benefits of just living in the
centre are relatively high. This will attract people who live from
some informal or even illegal activities. Costly monitoring of the
use of social services and of the monitoring of tax pay duties
seems the only answer to this problem of illegality.
In the next section we will look at the situation in the European
Union, as far as is relevant for our problem of institu tional
competition.
6. Institutional Competition in the European Union
6.1 Introduction
In the former section we have seen that a free market model
suggests that a large amount of municipalities of a rather
homogeneous composition will be formed, assumed that all indivi-
duals possess all relevant information and that mobility costs are
zero. The homogeneity of the different municipali ties is especially
related to the level of wealth and the preference orderings with
respect to LPG's of the residents. When we look at the economic
                                               
          7 Last year we have had referenda in Amsterdam as well as
in Rotterdam (both Dutch metro poles) about the
formation of a new and larger jurisdiction. Nearly all
politicians in both cities were in favor of the new
municipality. But in both referenda a large majority of
the citizens voted against the proposed change!
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geographical map of the EU, and compare it with the migration flows
between the various EU-countries, it is immedia tely clear that the
assumptions are irrealistic. Large differen ces in wealth and
politi cal prefe rences have not led to huge migration flows. Some
examples show migration over a relative large distance, but most of
the time these flows occur within a particular coun try; from South
to North Italy being a good example. Cross country border migration
takes place on a rather short distance (Ita lians to Switzerland;
Finnish to Sweden; in most cases tempo rarily).
The problem we want to deal with i n this section is the questi-
on whether the Maastricht Treaty has created a situation that will
induce considerable migration flows between the various countries.
We discuss a number of differen ces between the EU-countries that
may push people to migrate and a number of factors that may be
serious barriers for people to migrate. When dealing with the
effect of "Maastricht", we define the Treaty for our purpose as a
decision of all EU countries to prohibit discrimina tion be tween
workers of EU-countries.                                 
6.2  Determinants of Migration
A first factor that may be of relevance is the difference in wealth
or income between the different countries. In the appendix in table
1 we have presented figures expressing economic growth in the
different EU-countries. Although these figures do not express the
wealth of the EU-nations, income is a good proxy of it. Ex perts as
well as public consider EU-mem bership as a positive factor in terms
of economic growth. In that sense the diffe re nces have to be rather
large when we have to expect a signi ficant push towards migration.
The table shows that there is not a signifi cant difference in
growth rates between South and North. This means that the gap
between the different wealth le vels do not grow. A second factor
that may stimulate migration is a marked difference in unemployment
between the different coun tries. In their search for jobs
unemployed are not bound to their own country, but the whole area
of the EU is now their hunting ground.
Table 1  Real GDP in Western Europe (Percentage change over
previous year)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a
Austria 4.6 3.0 1.8 -0.1 2.8 3.0
Belgium 3.7 1.9 1.9 -1.7 2.3 3.0
Denmark 2.0 1.0 0.8 1.5 4.6 3.5
Finland 0.3 -7.1 -3.6 -1.6 3.9 5.0
France 2.2 3.3 1.2 -1.0 2.5 3.0
Germanyb 5.1 4.5 2.2 -1.1 2.9 3.0
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Greece -0.2 3.3 0.8 -0.5 1.0 1.5
Ireland 7.1 2.6 5.0 4.0 6.5 6.5
Italy 2.2 1.3 0.7 -0.7 2.3 3.0
Netherlands 3.9 2.1 1.3 0.4 2.4 3.0
Norway 1.8 1.9 3.4 2.3 5.1 4.5
Portugal 4.4 2.1 1.5 -0.9 1.0 2.5
Spain 3.6 2.2 0.7 -1.1 2.0 3.0
Sweden 0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -2.6 2.2 2.0
United King-
dom
0.5 -2.2 -0.5 2.1 3.8 3.0
Source: Economic Bulletin for Europe, Secretariat of the Economic Community of Europe, Vol. 44,
45, 47, United Nations, New York and Geneva, respectively 1992, 1993, 1995.
a Forecasts rounded to the nearest 0.5 percentage point.
b West-Germany.
In table 2 to be found in the appendix we have presented macro-unemployment figures to
get a rough idea of the direction of future migration flows. A remarkable feature is that, in
contrast to the sixties, not only the South, but also the North is characterized by many
unemployed. This development implies a serious bottleneck for people from the South to
migrate to the North. From studies on national labour markets we know however, that
analyses on a desaggregated level can lead to different pictures. The example of the
seasonal cutting of asparagus in The Netherlands is illustrative. Dutch unemployed refuse
to do the job. Polish workers travel to the Dutch asparagus fields and offer themselves to
do it for a rather low wage. Some of them are really getting the job, but this is illegal. In
reaction to policing activities of the government the employers started to search for
workers in other countries. In 1996 Portuguese people were willing to do the job. So on the
micro level of the different occupations and regions, we see what really happens. The
existence of social legislation which differs significantly between the various EU-countries,
has made the unemployment figure to an unreliable predictor with respect to future
migration flows. High levels of social benefits make that many potential low wage jobs are
not created. But if employers discover that in other areas of Europe or even outside Europe
there is a large supply for these kind of jobs, then a strong incentive exists for flows of
illegal immigration.
Table 2  Standardized unemployment rates in Europe, seasonally adjusted
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993a 1994b 1995c
Austria 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.6
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Belgium 7.2 7.1 7.8 8.6 9.7 9.8
Denmark 9.5 10.4 11.2 12.2 12.1 10.1
Finland 3.4 7.5 13.0 17.7 18.0 17.6
France 9.0 9.4 10.3 11.6 12.3 11.6
Germanyd 4.9 4.4 4.8 6.1 6.9 6.8
Greece 7.0 7.6 9.2 9.7 9.6 9.9e
Ireland 13.4 14.9 16.1 15.6 14.3 12.8
Italy 10.3 9.9 10.1 10.3 11.4 12.1
Netherlands 7.5 7.0 6.8 6.2 7.2 6.7
Norway 5.2 5.5 5.9 6.0 5.4 5.2
Portugal 4.6 4.1 4.1 5.5 6.8 7.2
Spain 15.9 16.0 18.1 22.4 23.8 22.5
Sweden 1.5 2.7 4.8 9.5 9.8 9.1
United King-
dom
6.8 8.7 9.9 10.4 9.5 8.8
Source: Economic Bulletin for Europe, Secretariat of the Economic Community of Europe, Vol. 44,
45, 47, United Nations, New York and Geneva, respectively 1992 (p. 14), 1993 (p. 30), 1995 (p.
12).
a Adjusted for comparability, except Austria, Denmark and Greece.
b Idem
c Figures of the second quarter of 1995
d West-Germany
e Average unemployment rate forecast by OECD
A third factor is the presence of social legislation that offers entitlements to people who are
not able to care for themselves. These rights to receive an income or particular services
diminish the necessity to look for a job and a living in other countries. Benefit recipients in
liberal and the lower ranked recipients in conservative countries have an incentive to
migrate to countries with a more social democratic regime. Net tax payers in especially the
social democratic countries have an incentive to migrate to countries with a lower tax
level, that are the conservative and especially the liberal countries. In table 3 we have
divided the EU-countries into the three categories, as they are distinguished by Esping-
Andersen. He has used the concept of "de-commodification" as is developed by Polanyi
(1944). The social rights that are developed in the welfare state differ in the degree to which
they permit people to make their standards of living independent of pure market forces. The
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liberal countries are the countries with the lowest scores and the social-democratic
countries with the highest scores. The conservative countries take a middle position.
Table 3 The clustering of welfare states according to conservative, liberal and socialist
regime attributes
conservatism liberalism socialism
strong       
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
 strong
Australia
Canada
Japan
Switzerland
United States
 strong
Denmark
Finland
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
 medium
Finland
Ireland
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
 medium 
Denmark
France 
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
United Kingdom
 medium
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Germany
New Zealand
Switzerland
United Kingdom
 low
Australia
Canada
Denmark
New Zealand
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
 low
Austria
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
 low
Austria
France
Ireland
Italy
Japan
United States
Source: G.Esping-Andersen (1990),p.74.
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A fourth factor are the transportation costs to bridge the geographical distance that
have constantly diminished as a result of progress in transport technology..
A fifth factor is related to the existing cultural distance between the different EU-
countries. Although the different cultures emerge to a certain extent, differences that exist
for already more than two thousand years will not disappear in one or two decennia.
Hofstede has developed a culture theory and have tried to measure culture by means of four
dimensions (Hofstede, 1980). In the first place do we have the difference between masculine
and feminine societies. In masculine societies typical masculine values, such as threatening
and showing your strength, are dominant, whereas in typical feminine societies feminine
values, such as protecting and caring, dominate.
In the second place Hofstede distinguishes between societies with a small versus
societies with a large power distance. The concept of power distance expresses the distances
as perceived by a person between the own rank and the higher rank(s). It measures the
degree of hierarchical thinking in a particular society.
A third dimension is individualism, as opposed to collectivism. In some cultures
people are used to think in terms of "we" or "they", whereas in other cultures large
numbers of people have developed a way of thinking in which the "I" and "him" or "her"
take a central place.
A last and may be the most elementary dimension of culture is the degree of uncert-
ainty avoidance. Some people are inclined to do everything to reduce the uncertainty of
life, whereas other people have learned themselves to live with a rather high level of
uncertainty. In table 4 we have presented the scores of the EU-countries with respect to the
four dimensions just discussed. The larger the difference in scores, the more difficult it is for
an individual to migrate. We see that the Northern countries are highly individualistic, in
contrast to some of the Southern countries as Portugal and Greece. With respect to power
distance we see that countries as Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece are
more hierarchical in their thinking than the other countries. With respect to masculinity we
see that the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands are very feminine, in contrast to
Central and South Europe. Uncertainty avoidance shows more or less the same picture as
is the case with masculinity. An overall conclusion must be that there are significant
differences in culture, which may function as a serious bottleneck for migration. In
interpreting the scores we must know that Hofstede has constructed them in such a way
that they can run from about zero to about hundred.8  
                                               
          8 If one is interested in the technical aspects of the
calcula tion of the scores, made by Hofstede, then one
must look for a careful description chapter 2 of his
"Culture's Conse quences".
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Table 4 Hofstede-scores for 15 European countries
Country
Cultural Dimension
DV PDI MAS UAI
Austria 55 11 79 70
Belgium 75 65 54 94
Denmark 74 18 16 23
Finland 63 33 26 59
France 71 68 43 86
Germany 67 35 66 65
Greece 35 60 57 112
Ireland 70 28 68 35
Italy 76 50 70 75
Netherlands 80 38 14 53
Norway 69 31 8 50
Portugal 27 63 31 104
Spain 51 57 42 86
Sweden 71 31 5 29
Un. Kingdom 89 35 66 35
Source: Cultures and Organizations; Software of the Mind, IRIC, University of Limburg, Maastricht
1991.
IDV = Individualism index
PDI  = Power distance index
MAS = Masculinity index
UAI = Uncertainty avoidance index
Although there are severe cultural barriers in the EU, a number of developments has had a
positive effect on the mobility of people within the EU. In the first place is the language
barrier lower than in earlier times because the increase in the number of people that speak
some English. One of the main reasons for the growing impact of English is the enormous
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growth in use of communication media, of which television has the greatest impact. Via
television there is a kind of global culture growing. This diminishes the cultural gap
between the various countries in the world. In our case of the EU we can expect especially a
smaller gap between North and South Europe.
A factor that makes it easier for people to bridge a cultural gap is the presence of
groups of 'pioneers' who are already migrated to another countries. The first immigrants of
a particular ethnicity must really deal with cultural differences. If they succeed and stay,
they form, most of the time, a group who have frequent contact with each other and with
their home country. They form a network with contacts in their home country.9 If the
pioneers are successful, other people will also make plans to migrate. In this way a small
flow can explosively grow, at least as long as there are opportunities for them to earn a
decent living.
Another factor that may be of high relevance for understanding and predicting the
direction of future migration flows, is the demographic development (King, 1994;
Briggs,1994). Many immigrants appear to be fathers of families with a relatively high
number of children. For these families is having an income a matter of survival. This makes
it easier for one of the parents to decide to go abroad. If the father is successful he stays
and sends regular remittances to his family. During the sixties and seventies this has
happened in Europe. In many cases the father changed his original plan to stay only
temporary into a request to the host country to allow also his family to come and to
establish in the host country permanently. Most governments have conceded to let the
families reunite.
A last factor that may be relevant are the differences in climate. People who are
looking for opportunities to live and work in richer areas undoubtedly prefer a
Mediterranean to a more moderate sea or continental climate. An irregular life in Southern
Italy is much easier than in Northern Sweden. In table 5 have we presented the average
temperatures in the periods January and June of the EU-countries plus Norway. It is clear
that this factor is a barrier to a flow of irregular labour from South to North.
6.3 Expected Migration
Up to know we have discussed the factors separately, that is under the ceteris paribus
condition. When we put the factors together, we can make a few additional remarks.
In the first place we see that there is a dominating difference between South and
North, although not only the South, but also the North has its periphery (Ireland,
Scotland, North Scandinavia). In terms of wealth and income the South is relatively poor,
whereas the North is relatively rich. In terms of demography the Southern rate of
population growth is higher than the Northern rate. Looking at the level of social
assistance and social security we see that the Southern levels are lower than the Northern
levels. This fact is not an expression of different political preferences, but a matter of
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this process is called the chain theory. See for
instance: OECD, 1978, 1987.
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difference in wealth. Taking the factors just mentioned together, they all indicate a future
flow of migration from South to North. When we consider the emergence of income growth
rates and assume that the positive prospects influences significantly the perspectives of the
workers, then we can draw the conclusion that a relatively small migration flow is more
probable than a more voluminous one. When looking at the unemployment figures, we
must expect an even lower level of migration. The Northern countries, although on average
very rich, are in trouble. Many people are unemployed and the welfare system, supported
by a majority of the voting people, is under heavy (financial) pressure. This will
undoubtedly diminish the chances for immigrants to get an attractive job.
A second remark is that we must distinguish between several kinds of migration.
There is a group of people who consider themselves as chanceless in the home country and
are looking for better opportunities. They take initiative, go abroad and accept a very low
level of wealth. They accept it, because they perceive a better perspective, compared to the
situation in their home country. Illegal jobs, social benefits, or barter exchange are familiar
ways for them during their waiting time; waiting for their chance to get a legal, well paid
job that can lead to a decent living. In the migration literature this is called "push"-flows.
Another group of immigrants are people who are hired by foreign employers. They recruit
new workers in foreign countries, because the foreigners are expected to be better than the
autochthon people. Better in the sense of 'not indulged', hard working and eager to learn
something, while satisfied with a rather low wage. In the migration literature this is called
"pull"-flows. What we can expect in the context of a free European labour market is that
the push-flow will be rather small and going from South to North, but that the second
group may increase. Especially if there are no cultural barriers, a free European labour
market will to an increasing extent offer the opportunities to match efficiently the vacancy
- unemployed of the same characteristics. Expressed in technical terms does it mean a shift
of the V-U-curve to the left (Hansen, 1993). In this case we cannot discover a particular
pattern in the migration flows. They can stream from every country to every other country.
The immigrants can be very temporary to permanent. When we look at the economic
restructuring of the global economy, then we can especially expect temporary detachment
of (highly) skilled workers (King, 1994).  
A third remark is about the distance factor. Decreasing transportation costs have
made migration cheaper, in whatever direction. The emergence of a kind of global culture
and of a global information network will make it easier to move. In this respect we want
to memorize results from empirical research of Mintzberg (1990) about the openness of
organisations of a Roman Catholic culture relative to that of Protestant like
organisations. It appeared that people from Roman Catholic descent had little difficulties
in working in an organisation that was managed in a Protestant way. People coming from
Protestant run organizations had much difficulty in working in an organization run by
Roman Catholic modes of behaviour. The explanation of the difference he found was that a
Protestant culture is far more explicit. Rules and agreements must be taken literally. If one
disagrees with other people, one is expected to make that explicit. If one does not oppose
clearly, one is supposed to favour particular arrangements. If one says yes, it is yes, and
not no or tomorrow. In this respect is living in a Roman Catholic culture more complex
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and only easy for the real insiders. During the years they have learned to interpret words,
tones of discussion or particular events. If a Protestant worker has to work in a Roman
Catholic environment, he constantly makes mistakes because of misunderstandings. If a
Roman Catholic worker has to work in a Protestant environment however, it is rather
clear for him what is really expected. Although he may dislike Protestant cultural
characteristics, one barrier has fortunately removed. Applying this result to our migration
problem, a flow from South to North would be stimulated in contrast to a flow from North
to South.
What is left, is Hofstede's view that cultural roots are very tenacious. Two thousand or
more years of experience of various rules and habits cannot be changed in one or two
decennia. The reluctance of Scandinavia to enter the EU, the French nationalism and the
British resistance to processes of European centralisation are examples, illustrating the fact
that Europe is far from culturally homogeneous.
Concluding this section we have the impression that the push-flows from poor to
rich will be of limited size. The pull-flows will be larger, but if the administrations of the
different social systems are interconnected, this will not grow out to a serious problem.
When we look at the ethnic minority groups in the EU-area, we must conclude that the
external migration is far more serious than the internal migration. That will be the subject
of section 8.       
In the next section we will deal with the question whether Brussels has a role to
play in the eventual coordination of social arrangements, that are concluded in the
different nations of the EU.
7. Towards a European Welfare State
7.1 Different Views on the European Future
If Brussels does not develop special policies to effectively deal with the problems that are
induced by these growing flows, we can predict severe and growing social tensions and
economic mismatches. The "push"-flows will lead to a kind of social shopping. The "pull"-
flows will lead to a growing claim on the generous social funds of the rich and social
democratic countries. If foreign workers become unemployed they are inclined to use funds
in that country that is generous to its unemployed. If not, then they will be inclined to
return to their home country. The third mentioned flow, coming from outside the EU, has
been limited up to now because of the immigration stop that is announced during the
seventies. Abolishment of this measure could be disastrous for most or may be all EU-
countries. So the question is now: what must Brussels do?
From a liberal point of view all members will be advised to introduce liberal
policies. Brussels must do nothing. Every foreigner falls back on the social assistance
system of his home country, except if a host country accepts a foreigner as being a
permanent citizen of his new country. If the economic developments of the different
members converges, the time will come that the social assistance benefits will be more or
less the same. If a number of European countries decide, by a vast majority, that they want
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to be part of a bigger whole (EU), they assign authority to the EU-government. From then
on Brussels can take its decisions with respect to a EU-minimum of social assistance. This
is considered the only real and liberal road to individual freedom in Europe.
From a conservative point of view all members will be advised to implement a
conservative, that is a corporatist structure to establish consensus. Brussels must also
develop a consensus producing tripartite consultation platform. There can every rank,
industry, vocation or guild establish its own European consultation platform. These
European corporative associations can coordinate the different national policies. If the
social security arrangements differ much from country to country, then coordination must
take place, deciding about the allocation of the EU workers over the different social
jurisdictions. In case of a strong convergence of income levels, the various countries may
decide upon the formation of a real EU-authority, which could take its decisions after
consultation of the various European corporative associations. This is considered the only
real and conservative road to European brotherhood.
From a social democratic point of view all members will be advised to implement
social democratic institutions. Brussels has the task to stabilize European expenditures on
a level that is necessary to create and maintain full employment. The European unions
must negotiate with the European employers about wage level and additional employment
for discriminated groups. The EU-government has the task to intervene into the
negotiations if the general European interests are not served well by the negotiating
parties. And last but not least has the EU-government the task to redistribute resources
from the rich to the poor parts of the EU. European solidarity means that in terms of
income as well as in terms of social services a European minimum has to be established
and differences diminished. After the establishment of such European institutions, free
flows of labour can take place. The disadvantages of the free labour market are made as
small as possible. On the other hand are the activities that are advantageous for all parties
given free way. This is considered the only real and social democratic road to an equal and
harmonious European society.   
7.2  Assessment of the Different Views
Assessing the various roads in the context of the current situation in Europe, we must say
that the liberal view fits the modern process of secularisation and individualisation best. It
has the advantage that it accounts the individual for the consequences of his behaviour,
giving him a strong incentive to use all his capacities. This implies that individuals are
maximally motivated to change activities if changes in circumstances require this.
European experience shows however that in a system of free markets the inequality can be
severe. This has led to the formation of pressure groups focussed on a change in the social
structure. Liberalism has never formulated a clear answer to this problem of social conflict.
In the course of time many Europeans have accepted the social democratic ideas
about human rights, including the right of every person to get a number of social services,
housing, education and health. In this respect social democratic thinking has had a strong
influence on European public opinion. It has dampened social conflict by
institutionalization of a number of their ideas, such as progressive taxation. On the other
hand, social democrats did not understand that solidarity has its price. People are not
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willing to be solidary with an enormous number of poor people, irrespective the costs. The
mass of the people have appeared not to be prepared to bear a tax burden of 60% or higher,
in the name of an abstract principle or in the name of an infinite flow of people all over the
world. Local solidarity in a global society may in principle be unacceptable, but seems a
practical necessity.
The advantage of the conservative road to order is that it offers a functional
perspective. It has given people a meaningful context, which has limited competition and
rivalry between people to a certain extent. On the other hand can we draw the conclusion
that the conservative institutional framework was not only stabilizing social
relationships, but it made economic relationships very rigid. It has appeared to be a
structure that is very suited for vested interests to defend itself against new interests.
Technical, economic and social progress is easily hampered in a conservatively organized
society. Extremely formulated will the conservative strategy lead to the order and stability
of a cemetery.
 
Up to now we have dealt with liberalism, social democracy and conservatism as ideal
types. When we want to deal with them in a more historical way, we must admit that all
three currents has adapted themselves to changing circumstances. Nevertheless is it useful
to define a never changing hard core of the three currents. The liberal hard core concerns the
individual freedom, not only as an ultimate goal, but also as an efficient instrument
towards wealth for everyone. The social democratic hard core concerns the equality of all
men, which implies that every individual has the right to satisfy a number of basic needs.
The conservative hard core concerns the inequality of men, leading to a natural hierarchy.
This hierarchy leads to order if every rank is aware of its rights as well its duties or
(moral) obligations.
The liberals have difficulties in dealing with social conflicts. The social democrats
have problems with the experience that a process of equalization has its price and even its
limits. The conservatives have difficulties with the requirements of fast changing technical
and economic structures. Technical and economic flexibility is hampered by the conserva-
tive need for a careful reformulation of the rights and obligations of the newly emerging
ranks.
An efficient solution to the problem of European institutional competition cannot
be based on one ideology. The EU must find a solution that maximizes the advantages of
all three views and minimizes the disadvantages of them. Without pretending to have
found the solution, we just want to give an example of a workable proposal, meant as an
illustration of our multi-ideology argument.
PROPOSAL MEANT AS AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
(1) For the moment not any country must be enforced to change its social system
significantly; only voluntary adjustments directed to harmonisation must be
welcomed.
(2) Every adult citizen who is unable to satisfy his basic needs, has the right to receive
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a social assistance benefit and to be eligible to a number of elementary services,
such as housing, education and health care. His home country has the obligation to
pay.
(3) If a worker migrates from one EU-country to another EU-country, then he falls
under the social jurisdiction of the host country. He pays the obligatory social
premiums and can use the rights he has received.
(4) If a foreign worker gets unemployed, he will receive an unemployment benefit for a
couple of months, from the host country. During that period he can search for anot-
her job, in the host country as well as his home country. After some time the benefit
decreases, until the maximum time of the unemployment security has achieved. Then
the unemployed falls back on the social assistance of the home country. The same
holds if a foreign worker gets disabled and cannot work anymore. He will receive a
disability benefit during some time. During that period the level of the benefit
decreases, until the maximum period of the disability security has reached. Then he
falls back on the social assistance of his home country.
(5) If a worker has worked in several EU-countries, and he becomes unemployed or
disabled, then during the first months the host country is paying the benefit. After
some time the benefit will be paid by all countries where the worker has worked and
paid social premiums. The different contributions are determined by the level of the
premiums and the length of the period that premiums has been paid.
(6) The task of "Brussels" is to set up a social administration that functions as a
clearing house. This social office gets all the information with respect to the
workers, their premiums paid and the benefits they have received. The office
calculates the benefits and premiums to be received and paid on the basis of the
different national legislations. So the task of our European Social Clearing House is
limited to the activities 'registration', 'calculation' and 'clearing'. If 'Brussels'
would operate along the lines just sketched, would that mean an enormous increase
in the efficiency with respect to labour market transactions throughout the EU-
area.
Meanwhile the EU can go on by trying to harmonise the different social systems. The
convergence of wealth levels will appear to be a crucial factor. A process that lowers
cultural barriers would enhance an efficient labour market match. When we look at the
ethnic conflicts in the EU-countries at the moment, then it is immediately clear that the
intra-EU migration is not a serious problem at the moment. If Brussels will be able to
develop efficient labour market policies, then the EU can prevent serious social conflicts.
But the observation of ethnic conflicts gives rise to another question, that has to do with
the immigration from outside the EU. Notwithstanding the official immigration stop is the
number of non EU-citizens in the EU-area high and increasing. Especially there is a rise in
political asylum seekers and in illegal immigration. In the next section we will make a
number of remarks about this increasing problem.
8. European Solidarity and Global Competition
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Within the EU-borders some migration has taken place in the postwar period. Especially
people from the South went to the North. But when we consider the main ethnic minority
populations in the EU-area, then we discover immediately that the external migration is
far more voluminous. In appendix A we have presented some quantitative information
about the main development in this respect. Most of these immigrants are located in the
large metro poles of the EU. Surinams, Maroccans and Turkish people in the City Holland,
Turkish in Berlin, West Indian people and people from India and Pakistan in London,
Algerians and Maroccans in Paris, Lyon and especially Marseille are good illustrations of
this phenomenon.
Can we apply the analyses we used in section 3, to clarify these flows? The analysis
of Tiebout can be applied to understand the flow of poor people to the large cities. Many
people live in situations without any perspective. Many of them think it worthwhile to
live in the slums of large cities in their own country. But others take the initiative to (ille-
gally) immigrate to richer countries. Then they find a place in the slums of the large cities
there. If these migrants have already connections with relatives who have appeared to be
successful, then their chances are better. But the other are just waiting .....(McDonald,
Solow, 1985).10 The Tiebout analysis explains the flow of rich people from the large cities,
to get their own, more homogeneous municipalities. Hochman et al. explains why the rich
settle themselves in the neighbourhoods of large cities, more than in small villages in the
country. They only want to take distance from the poor and the problems of violence and
other forms of criminality. To take distance of 10-30 miles, the attractive LPG's of the city
and the life style products of high quality remains within their scope. The Pauly analysis
can explain why large cities still exist apparently accept that poverty belongs to a large
city and that a kind of welfare system is needed to keep the problem under control.
The libertarian problem of having "not any welfare program at all", does not exist
in Europe. But on the other hand, moral hazard at the social benefit and subsidy side and
evasion at the tax and social premium side shows undoubtedly that there are limits to the
growth of the welfare production.
If constructors of welfare systems ignore the fact that most people are only solidary
with some other people, to some extent, these systems will sooner or later go bankrupt.
As is the case with the organisation of a welfare state, the immigration policy reflects to a
                                               
          10 McDonald and Solow distinguish three groups of workers:
the insiders who have a job in the primary labour
market, the outsi ders who have a job or are searching
for a job in the secondary labour market and a third
group, who are unemployed but are only looking for a job
in the primary sector. We can inter pret the group of
people who move to the metro poles in the rich countries
and wait and search for opportunities there, as the se-
cond group, whereas the autochton unemployed belong to
the third group, called the transitory unemployed.
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certain degree the political view of the dominant groups in society.
The conservative view on immigration implies a restrictive admittance policy and
extensive monitoring activities to prevent illegal immigration. Selective immigration of a
pull character may be allowed: employers recruit foreigners because their skills are scarce.
They are lodged together and stay only temporary. If necessary, a system of rotation is
implemented, to prevent that the foreigners get integrated into the host society. Germany of
the sixties and seventies followed that road. The Arab oil countries do it this way, but
much more extreme than the Germans did.
The liberal view would be, at least if the world is one immense market economy, to
abstain from any protection. The market must decide who is working and living in certain
areas; not governments. A liberal island in a world of regulated and therefore highly
disequilibrated sea however, would be flooded in the absence of dikes11 .
The social democratic view would allow free migration if there would be a global
system of welfare and full employment maintenance. But a social democratic island in a
badly regulated sea, would be flooded by poorly equipped people. So, an immigration stop
is unavoidable for such a social democratic island. Whereas for liberals such a stop is
necessary to protect the individual freedom of the insiders, for socialists however, the stop
means a break in the international solidarity. It makes social democrats feel guilty about
it, leading to a softening of the necessary monitoring of the (illegal) flows.
Conservative toughness, liberal tolerance and social democratic ambiguity are the ideal
typical answers to the problem of immigration from poor people to the rich centres in the
world.       In European political practice Conservative and social-democratic thought are
stronger than liberal thought as we look at the official statements of political parties. But
the idea of individual freedom has strongly influenced most people.
The necessity of coalition formation implies the possibility of inconsistent
compromises. The question is now, whether we can construct more efficient combinations
of policy measures. It must be possible to combine conservative seriousness in keeping the
law, the liberal freedom of individuals to get an efficient market economy and a social
democratic solidarity transfer system, of which the extendedness and generosity is
dependent on the payability of the system. Without pretending to have found the solution,
we just want to give an illustration.
* the maximum degree of redistribution is determined by the wealth level and the
optimal tax rate (a Rawls-like principle) and the income elasticity of social conflict
                                               
          11 Some of the Libertarians really defend open borders, to
wit Julian Simon of the Cato Institute and Henry Simon,
one of the founders of the Chicago School. But Melvin
Reder (Chicago) and Gary Becker (Chicago) defend
restrictive immigration poli cies, because of the
downward leveling of incomes of the more afflu ent
(Reder) and because of the social shopping in the
welfare states (Becker), in case of open borders. See
for quota tions and refe rences: Briggs, 1994.
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;        
* legislation is necessary to maintain a free market economy including a maximum
solidarity transfer;
* the solidarity transfer must be divided into three parts: administrative and policing
costs (1), transfers to poor outsiders of a particular jurisdiction (2) and transfers to
poor insiders of the jurisdiction under scrutiny (3);
* if a jurisdiction has delivered a maximum effort to be solidary, the state has the
moral right to use its policing equipment as effective as possible. First to keep
outsiders out of a particular area; second to keep outsiders out of a particular
social fund; third to let every citizen fulfil his duty to pay taxes according to the
rules of the taxing system.                                                        
In this solution effective are law and order, a free market economy and internal and
external solidarity transfer efficiently combined.
Applying to our problem of the European welfare state in the context of global
competition, we would advise the EU to contribute as much as it can to reduce sources of
social conflict, inside as well as outside. The maximum tax receipts must be divided
between European administrative and policing costs, solidarity transfers inside the EU and
solidarity transfers to poor outside the EU. This will give the EU the legitimacy to
maintain its immigration stop, which must be made effective by spending a relatively high
amount of resources to monitoring. Because an effective stop is, however legitimized for
EU-citizens, morally hard to accept, can the EU-state add two policies: it can press for a
different global structure (1) and it can offer its citizens administrative help in organising
effective solidarity on a private basis. Up to now, private solidarity is called charity and
has a connotation of "only for soft people and of "nonbinding" and "voluntary". A diffe-
rent atmosphere is necessary to make the product "private solidarity" to a booming indus-
try.
With respect to the first point we can mention two measures, meant as an
illustration, that can be striven for. The first is the development by the UN of a plan for a
global pension arrangement. We may expect that the implementation has the potential to
diminish demographic pressures.12
A second example may be the establishment of a number of asylums, spread over the
world. These asylums must be designed to host large numbers of people, who cannot earn
their own living and/or are politically threatened. A minimum of care must be offered:
nutrition, shelter, education, discipline, work, sport. A constant selection must take place
to determine which people can be sent back home. These asylums will also make it easier to
                                               
          12 It is an established fact that many pare nts in the
poorer countries regard their children as a safety net
for the period when they become too old to earn their
own living. A globally guaranteed pension might have a
significant effect on the number of children per family.
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implement tough immigration stops. A rich country will never send people away, but
always send people to somewhere; and that is morally spoken a marked difference! Global
solidarity must be interpreted as "helping people in their own environment. Immigration
ought to have a pull character, not only a different place to wait for...
Epilogue
This article was on institutional competition. Three institutional figurations has been
discussed: the conservative, the liberal and the social democratic one. We have seen that all
three stresses a particular aspect, paying less attention to the other aspects. The
conservatives focus their attention on the problem of maintaining hierarchical order and
law. The liberals however, take the individual freedom and efficiency  and the social
democrats the equality and social justice as their hard core. But every institutional
framework must give an answer to all the three questions of efficiency, justice and control;
we must realise that the three problems are highly interrelated. In the liberal approach
perfect control and justice is assumed as an automatic and spontaneous consequence of
individual freedom. In the social democratic approach the amount of individual freedom
that is possible, is derived from the way how justice can be achieved. Control is an implicit
and automatic consequence of the achievement of justice. In the conservative approach it is
assumed that efficiency and justice are automatically achieved if the problem of control is
solved: everyone in his rank and on his place , supported by a well organised hierarchical
structure, including monitoring and sanctioning if necessary. More apparent however, will
be that actual frameworks are mixes of elements of the three approaches. The danger of
mixes are the potential inconsistencies (Keizer, 1996b). So we can finish by concluding that
more consistent institutional mixes  drive out less consistent mixes.
Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.
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